Category Archives: Vol. 2 No. 1

Faculty Introduction for “1989: Tailoring Chinese Dissidents for American Consumption”

Read “1989: Tailoring Chinese Dissidents for American Consumption”.

The directors of the documentary film The Gate of Heavenly Peace “join a battle” for the meaning of June 1989, writes Claire Ren in this Perspectives on the Humanities essay. In writing a critical response to the film, Claire joins this battle too. Driven by her fascination with the film’s complexity and her skepticism of Western reports about the events, Claire developed a research inquiry which situated the film in the context of American media narratives. Her inquiry progressed through cycles of immersion and refinement: from an in-depth reading of the film to a project proposal, from hours of research to an annotated bibliography, from several drafts to a submitted essay. The final submission is a powerful act of criticism, through which Claire adds her voice to the debate over the film’s significance and legacy.

—Amy Becker, Director of and Senior Lecturer in the Writing Program

1989: Tailoring Chinese Dissidents for American Consumption

by Ren Yixin (Claire)

Read the Faculty Introduction.

“Events do not deliver their meanings to us. They are
always interpreted.”

– The Gate of Heavenly Peace

While the 1989 student movement remains a topic of heated discussion in the West, in China it is forced into national amnesia because discussion of and retrospection on the event have been strictly censored in the mainstream media, if not outright banned. Details of the crackdown on June Fourth have not been disclosed to the public since its occurrence, and the divergent yet individually coherent Eastern and Western interpretations of the historical mystery suggest that there are multiple possible truths at work. Six years after the student demonstrations gripped global attention through massive media coverage, the release of The Gate of Heavenly Peace (hereafter abbreviated as The Gate) in 1995 brought back painful memories of the seven-week-long student movement in China. In the face of China’s denial of the massacre and U.S. reluctance to endanger business interests and diplomatic ties, the directors Carma Hinton and
Richard Gordon join the battle for the meaning of these events and self-consciously engage in the writing of history (Taylor). Interweaving videotaped scenes of the demonstrations and conversations with participants and eyewitnesses, The Gate provides a detailed chronicle from mid-April 1989, when the public mourning of pro-democracy party leader Hu Yaobang provoked demonstrators’ expression of long-standing frustration with the lack of political freedoms, to June Fourth, when the sequence of protests culminated in a government crackdown.

Upon its premiere at the 1995 New York Film Festival, The Gate received wide acclaim. Hinton and Gordon amassed over 250 hours of archival footage from nine different countries and conducted lengthy, thoughtful interviews with intellectuals, workers, former government officials, and Chinese student leaders (Lee 134; Litzinger 837). Critics applaud that by including a multiplicity of different voices and a detailed historical background, “[the film] escapes the sensationalism that informed much of the media coverage” and “presents a balanced and ‘dialogical’ perspective on the Tiananmen protests” (Litzinger 828, 837). Acclaimed film critic Charles Taylor remarks that it has “the richness, clarity, and complexity that only the best documentaries afford,” and another critic goes further, saying “[s]uch richness of material is perfect for classroom teaching at the university level” (Lee 134). The Gate is also praised for its masterfully designed web page, a comprehensive digital collection of posters, photographs, music, videos and scholarly works that together explore the underlying themes of the student occupation, such as nationalism, human rights, reform, and revolution.

Situating the 1989 student movement in a larger historical background and analyzing it through the lens of political culture in China, The Gate achieves contextualization and demystification of the June Fourth events which other narratives—particularly those in the U.S. news media—fail to accomplish. By rejecting the dominant anti-communist rhetoric of those narratives, the film does not make the event an ideological commodity but an object of critical debate and meaningful commemoration. However, The Gate’s subtle argument that demonstrators had been socialized in a political culture from which they could never escape causes the film to diverge from a completely distanced, objective account of June Fourth. Though subtle, the negative portrayal of radical students and the ideological reading of the conflict between radical and conciliatory camps inadvertently reinforce the “alienatingly different” image of China from the freedom-granting democracies of the West (Chen 18).

June Fourth in the American News Media: Decontextualized and Mystified

Back in 1989, the U.S. news media domesticated June Fourth for the American audience by media broadcasts that were refracted through the lens of democracy promotion. Among all the iconic images that appeared in the news coverage, Tank Man is the most memorable—alone and unarmed, an ordinary Chinese man standing motionlessly in front of a battalion of armored tanks, which rolled to Tiananmen Square in response to the Chinese government’s martial law. Cut from a video, Tank Man is condensed and mythologized into a single frozen image and has been generally understood to represent a bold defiance of inhumane state machinery and a heightened and unsolvable tension between an authoritarian state and powerless citizens. A shockingly wide dissemination of the Tank Man image in the U.S. media and the image’s entrenchment in collective memory are indicative of the prevailing anti-communist rhetoric of the Western discourse on the June Fourth events. Tank Man also appears in The Gate, but the directors present him in a meaningfully different way that undermines the validity of the established American interpretation.

Yasmin Ibrahim, an extensive publisher on international communications, uses Tank Man as an example to reflect on the problematic role of popular news images in representing events. The recurrence of Tank Man, in both media coverage then and anniversary commemorations in the following decades, affirms his “indexicality” to the June Fourth events (Ibrahim 583). Recalling and retrieving the events of 1989 through the Tank Man, a single evocative image, inevitably results in “collapsing complex events into image narratives and delimiting political analysis into a trope of pro-democracy struggles” (Ibrahim 583). In the process of recirculation, the Tank Man image is “disembedd[ed]” from the original complex historical background, obfuscating the history; meanwhile, it gets “relocat[ed] in popular culture” and consumed within the changing contexts dictated by dominant cultural values and political ideologies (Ibrahim 586). This process of “disembedding” and “relocation” causes decontextualization, and the discourse power of the news media reinforces the anti-communist rhetoric that surrounds the June Fourth events.

Ibrahim’s view is echoed by Lee, Li, and Lee’s criticism that editorial news oversimplifies complex events according to pre-packaged ideology. In their article “Symbolic Use of Decisive Events: Tiananmen as a News Icon in the Editorials of the Elite U.S. Press,” Lee et al. examine references to June Fourth in the editorials of The New York Times and The Washington Post over time, in an attempt to show that the meaning associated with the event has changed along with the evolution of U.S.-China relations in the past two decades. From 1989 to 1992, the descriptive lexicon employed in the editorial discourse is “killing,” “slaughter,” and “massacre,” revealing strong moral condemnations (Lee et al. 342). At the end of the Cold War, the elite U.S. press still viewed China as a communist threat from the East and solidified the image of Tiananmen as a symbol of inhuman authoritarianism in the minds of American people. As the mouthpiece of American political ideology, the press turned June Fourth into a tool to stoke anti-communist sentiment, which in turn strengthens the might and righteousness of American liberalism. In this sense, the “[s]ocial memory” of June Fourth is “stripped of context” and becomes “unstable at the level of information” but “stable at the level of shared meanings” (Ibrahim 589). June Fourth in the editorial discourse, therefore, became less of a complex historical event full of nuanced information than a means to propagate the dominant political ideology.

Lee et al. also show that the meanings associated with June Fourth have been reenacted “through the process of continual recirculation” (337). In the second period from 1993 to 2000, Tiananmen “evolved from a sweeping symbol of authoritarianism and Communist dictatorship into a more concrete and specific symbol of human rights abuse” (Lee et al. 345). Into the 2000s, U.S.-China relations took a friendlier turn because of strategic reciprocity: America declared war on terrorism for which China’s alliance was important; China needed America’s support to enter the World Trade Organization. The focus of The New York Times’ and The Washington Post’s editorials shifted to the personal stories of Chinese dissidents and activists, and the use of Tiananmen was less condemnatory than commemorative (Lee et al. 348). Over time, June Fourth has evolved artificially from a catch-all symbol of dictatorship to an allusion to Beijing’s indifference to human life, and finally to an entry point for the press to comment on the current repressive political climate in China. Different generations of audiences are provided various versions of the story, causing them to perceive the same event in manipulatively different ways. The negative consequence is that June Fourth has been mystified over the course of circulation. In light of the persistence of journalistic accounts to either condense the sequence of events in 1989 to evocative images of debatable meaning such as the Tank Man, or to impart different symbolizations to a foreign event, it becomes easier to understand why the coherence of the global collective memory of June Fourth continues to be undermined by the discrepancies between various accounts of the story that correspond to changing national interests and cultural repertoire.

The Gate: An Attempt to Restore Historical Complexity to June Fourth

In contrast to the decontextualizing and obfuscating tactics utilized by other narratives to project self-serving ideologies, The Gate distinguishes itself by giving historical complexity back to June Fourth and narrating the event with distanced objectivity. The film succeeds in subverting, at least partially, the undercurrent of anti-communist sentiment that underlies most of the dominant American accounts. The first meaningful move that the film takes is to provide the video version of Tank Man early on, counteracting the misleading message sent by the popular motionless version. In the static image, it seems as though the tank is about to crush the innocent young man, which tempts the viewer to condemn the overpowering state. The photograph has become a cultural symbol of resistance. In contrast, the video clip in the film shows that, in fact, the tank changes its advance to back off from the man; it is the man who harasses the tank and even climbs up on it to flaunt his defiance. By providing the original videotape of Tank Man, the film argues that the military is not the callous authoritarian state machine that we have always assumed, but one that is capable of restraint and compromise. This argument sets the groundwork for the rest of the film to dissolve a series of misinterpretations that revolve around June Fourth.

Instead of directly delving into the events in 1989, the first thirty minutes of the film provide a fleshed-out account of decisive social transformations that China has undergone since the 20th century, from the May Fourth Movement, to the People’s Republic of China under Maoism, to the Cultural Revolution, to Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power, and finally, to the successes and ramifications of his economic liberalization initiatives. This lengthy recollection, which helps to provide insight into the historical roots of the event, orients the viewer to a larger historical context.

The recounting of recent Chinese history is an important contextualization strategy: instead of isolating June Fourth in a confined time span, which may very likely lead to simplistic conclusions due to a lack of context, the film equips the audience with the historical background necessary to understand the final crackdown in light of China’s inherited political radicalism. As Ralph Litzinger, Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Duke University, points out, “The time the viewer is asked to inhabit is not only the chronology of events traced through April, May, and June 1989 but extends as well to the last imperial regime and the birth of twentieth-century Chinese nationalism and Maoist socialism” (838). Cutting back and forth between videotaped scenes of former historical events and student demonstrations in 1989, this film strategy places “student actions, comments, and reflections in the context of a history of student radicalism” (Litzinger 837). The viewer is invited to understand students and their movements “as products of their own culture and time” (Litzinger 383).

While other narratives, particularly those in the news media, tend to frame June Fourth as a bilateral confrontational drama between the students and the government, The Gate highlights the Chinese government’s multiple concessions and its willingness to cooperate with the dissidents. In the film, every time the government conducts dialogue with student representatives, the voice of radical students always drowns out that of reform-minded students. The hope of reconciliation is repetitively ruined by student extremists’ demand that transformation into a liberal democratic state be completed overnight. Thus, “the conflict of the movement was not just between the students and the government, but between the students and an older, more cautious generation of intellectual dissidents, and within the student organizations themselves,” writes Charles Taylor. “[T]he tragedy was even deeper than we assumed, a result of missed opportunities, past demons, and unyielding positions on both sides” (Taylor). A simplistic characterization of the Chinese government as bigoted and repressive is the very foundation upon which anti-communist narratives are based. By exposing the audience to the unrecognized moderate side of the state, The Gate challenges those biases at a fundamental level and brings a more balanced appreciation of the Chinese government.

Regretfully, the historical richness of The Gate that is “perfect for classroom teaching at the university level,” as one critic terms it, does not yield much discourse power due to its confined circulation among liberal scholars in the West (Lee 134). Lee gives insight into the reason why the mass media has monopolized the power in giving meaning to June Fourth:

The overall effect [of the film] is overwhelming and perhaps more than a little confusing for the average television viewer in the West, whose viewing habits have been shaped by countless smooth, quick-cutting Hollywood movies and the fast-moving linear narrative mode of television news programs that do not require long attention spans. (134)

This statement can be corroborated by the fact that The Gate has reached a relatively small group of viewers compared to other documentaries. The film has not reached a large enough audience to exert otherwise considerable influence on the public discourse on June Fourth.

The Gate Ultimately Joins the Meta-Narrative of Democracy and Freedom

The Gate satisfies many of the demands we have placed on documentary films, and the audience is given the opportunity to engage with the wider significance of the events in 1989. But it is a dubious practice to uncritically laud the film’s historical realism without also interrogating the ways in which it inadvertently joins the larger Western discourse that attempts to code the series of 1989 events as a failed experiment of democracy in the distant Communist East. The Gate’s strategic treatment of U.S. journalist Philip Cunningham’s interview with Chai Ling speaks to the ideological force of the film’s underlying argument that student demonstrators had been radicalized by the very political atmosphere they intended to transform.

Chai Ling was the self-proclaimed commander in chief of the Tiananmen occupation, throughout which she insisted on uncompromising antagonism toward the state government even when there were chances for reconciliation. The film returns to the interview in bits and pieces more than fifteen times, juxtaposing Chai’s stinging denunciation of the government and fanatical appeal for violent insurrection in stark contrast with other interview subjects, who chiefly speak with reasoned reflection and advocate less confrontational means of political organizing. Litzinger observes an interesting tension between the film’s overall complexity and its over-reliance on Chai’s dramatic account; he writes:

What is striking to me is how the film, on the one hand, is so intent to show the complexity and deep historical roots of the tragedy, while on the other hand, it draws so much dramatic attention to the figure, words, and performance of the Chai Ling interview, which was, in fact, a very small part of the overall event. (842)

Geremie Barmé, an Australian sinologist as well as one of the screenwriters for The Gate, builds on Litzinger’s observation that the film is disproportionately devoted to the Chai interview, saying “[Chai] is seen as embodying, in a metonymic way, the Maoist State itself ” and “[she is] forced to occupy the space of the incommensurable other” (qtd. in Litzinger 843). In the interview, Chai reflects on the bitter divisions between moderate and radical student factions, reiterates the importance of taking extreme approaches unyieldingly against the corrupt hardline state, and repeatedly identifies bloodshed as the only means to awaken the Chinese to overthrow the brutal regime. All of her discussion of life and death, class division, and the red battle is reminiscent of the Maoist revolutionary rhetoric. The depiction of Chai—a gallant rebel
speaking the very language of the Party that she seeks to dethrone—is consistent with the film’s underlying argument that these passionate, young political activists, despite their best intentions, may never escape the political culture that has shaped their actions.

In addition to Chai Ling, there were numerous other students and intellectuals who went to the extreme to defend their political beliefs. Demonstrators broke up into two opposite camps, reform-minded or revolution-inclined, and acute tension rose between them. As the movement proceeds, “[t]hey try to stifle alternative positions, accuse their opponents of being traitors, and attempt to manipulate events to their advantage to maintain power,” writes Gina Marchetti, a critical theorist on cultural studies at University of Hong Kong (223). “Perhaps even more than the old men in power, the demonstrators are ‘children of Mao,’ and they exhibit the legacy of Mao’s romantic revolutionary idealism” (Marchetti 223). A cruel irony thus operates in the film: the protesters, in their quest for democratic representation, are portrayed as having adopted the very instruments of oppression that they were seeking to eradicate. The political infighting among demonstrators parallels the state’s suppression of dissenting views and persecution of opponents. The Gate, by presenting this striking resemblance—not in words, but in its methods of reenactment—turns our attention again to the Chinese political culture that looms large in the background and which has been incredibly powerful in molding the behaviors of both sides.

Moreover, The Gate’s portrayal of the idiosyncratic political culture in China joins the meta-narrative that promotes the most salient elements—democracy and freedom—of American national identity. Pauline Chen, a New York Times columnist, examines how the film creates an “alienatingly different” image of China:

For most Americans, the images of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement offered a vision of the Chinese people as reassuringly similar to ourselves. . . . In the subsequent brutal crackdown by the Chinese government on June 4, 1989, the illusion of similarity receded, and we again saw China as alienatingly different. (18)

Presented with the painful disjunction between these two sets of images, the viewer is reminded anew that democracy and freedom, which are pivotal to American national identity, are still very far from being achieved in China. The audience, therefore, is invited to interpret June Fourth as a failed episode of pursuing democracy, a tale about how political freedoms and participatory democracy are still lacking in a monolithic state ruled by an outmoded socialist system. The way in which the film subtly encourages the use of political stereotypes
about China has an actual effect of valorizing the values underpinning American liberalism. The Gate intensifies the United States’ ideology of seeing itself as the benchmark for and beacon of democracy and freedom. Hence, sadly, the film ends up joining the larger news media discourse that tries to peddle this ideological commodity, just like the strategic reenactment of Tank Man.

The Gate of Heavenly Peace ultimately participates in the dominant Western ideological discourse due to its problematic portrayal of Chinese demonstrators through the editing of interviews, its drawing of an analogy between protesters and the state to emphasize ingrained political radicalism and revolutionary idealism, and its subtle construction of an idiosyncratic image of China that stands in stark contrast to paradigmatic American ideals. Nevertheless, it will be unfair if we dismiss the film’s bold challenge of authoritative narratives of June Fourth in the West. The Gate has outstripped its numerous counterparts, primarily in the U.S. news media, by providing an objective reading of Tank Man, underscoring the moderate line within the Chinese government, and uncovering the complicated historical and political situations that led to June Fourth. Through making sense of June Fourth in light of the larger historical context and inherited political culture in China, The Gate is a successful attempt to restore historical complexity to the event. The film’s astute and thoughtful reading of Chinese society interrupts the interpretive coherence constructed by the U.S. news media which largely oversimplifies and condenses June Fourth into an ideological package.

Viewed from this perspective, The Gate has a dual interpretive identity: on the one hand, it tries to recover the causes, consequences, and historical truth of June Fourth; but, on the other, through igniting political stereotypes, it also successfully propagates American-flavored ideas of democracy and freedom. At the end of the day, the film does not escape the curse of the limit of representation—it was produced in a cultural environment that is imbued with stereotypical generalizations about June Fourth and about China, and it eventually joins the meta-narrative from which it intended to depart.


Works Cited

Chen, Pauline. “Screening History: New Documentaries on the Tiananmen Events in China.” Cineaste, vol. 22, no. 1, 1996, pp.18-22.www.jstor.org.proxy.library.nyu.edu/stable/41661136. Accessed 8 Nov. 2016.

Ibrahim, Yasmin. “Tank Man, Media Memory and Yellow Duck Patrol: Remembering Tiananmen on Social Media.” Digital Journalism, vol. 4, no. 5, 2016, pp. 582-96.

Lee, Chin-Chuan, Hongtao Li, and Francis LF Lee. “Symbolic Use of Decisive Events: Tiananmen as a News Icon in the Editorials of the Elite U.S. Press.” The International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 16, no. 3, 2011, pp. 335-56.

Lee, Leo Ou-fan. “Visualizing the Tiananmen Student Movement.” The China Journal, vol. 35, 1996, pp. 131-36. JSTOR, doi:10.2307/2950281. Accessed 21 Nov. 2016.

Litzinger, Ralph A. “Screening the Political: Pedagogy and Dissent in The Gate of Heavenly Peace.” Positions, vol. 7, no. 3, 1999, pp. 827-50.

Marchetti, Gina. From Tian’anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989-1997. Temple University Press, 2006.

Taylor, Charles. “A Tiananmen Square Documentary is the Holiday Movie of the Year.” Boston Phoenix, 4 Jan. 1996, www.bostonphoenix.com/alt1/archive/movies/reviews/01-04-96/THE_GATE_OF_HEAVENLY_PEACE.html. Accessed 21 Nov. 2016.

The Gate of Heavenly Peace. Directed by Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon, featuring Chai Ling, Wang Dan, Dai Qing, Ding Zilin, Han Dongfang and Wuer Kaixi. Ronin Films, 1995.

Cultural Beings in Context: Reassessing the Individual Locus of Cosmopolitanism

Image Credit: Jiang Shuo

by Ma Haitian 马海天

Read the Faculty Introduction.

As we navigate this diverse and changing world, our interactions with one other always include cultural encounters of values and perspectives. Determining how to live with differences in these values and perspectives then becomes a task that we constantly perform, the urgency of which significantly increases in the modern era, where cultures interact in more direct and confrontational manners. In the attempt to construct a healthy, non-hierarchical manner of interaction, cosmopolitanism has risen as a promising vision. We may literally interpret cosmopolitanism as a culture of the cosmos, or the world. Beyond the literal designation, however, the essential conceptualization of this cosmopolitan vision remains under debate. In “The Case for Contamination,” author Kwame Anthony Appiah critiques and differentiates cosmopolitanism from three candidate ways of interaction: cultural preservationism, anti-colonialism, and neo-fundamentalism. In juxtaposition, Appiah proposes his version of cosmopolitanism based on what he calls the “contamination model,” where individuals get accustomed to new cultural phenomena and gradually merge them into the existing cultural norms. Cultures contaminate each other through progressive mergence starting from the individual level. Now the question arises: has Appiah truly grasped cosmopolitanism in its entirety through this model?

Just as Appiah critiques the three alternative ways of interaction, I argue that Appiah’s project contains its own flaw as well. The primary problem with his contamination model rests in its underlying presumption of universal individual autonomy when it comes to cultural adaptation. In reality, collective entities always interfere with and restrain individual autonomy by bringing in social hierarchies. Argumentative negligence of such collective influence can lead to alienating individuals from the concrete cultural contexts they inhabit, turning them into homogeneous abstractions. In view of this universalist pitfall, I suggest the alternative approach of contemporary author Ross Douthat’s idea of “disappearance,” where we strive to understand other individuals’ perspectives precisely by associating them with their surrounding cultures and comprehending the way these particular cultural conditions shape individual identity. With this empathetic approach in mind, we can better transform that understanding into a wholehearted embrace of diverse individual experiences.

Before we analyze Appiah’s project, let us first look more carefully into his view of cosmopolitanism. Appiah describes the core of cosmopolitanism as “contamination—that endless process of imitation and revision.” Achieving this contamination requires everyone to “take an interest in their [other] civilizations,” which, according to Appiah, will enable us to “get used to one another.” Upon closer analysis, this process contains two steps: first to acknowledge and tolerate a different culture, and second to integrate the originally peculiar differences into the ordinariness of one’s cultural community.

Within this mechanism lies an important premise—that the fundamental agents of contamination are individuals as autonomous members within any given culture. Although situated within a particular cultural context, individuals in Appiah’s model reserve the autonomy to make choices—to acknowledge and accept rather than reject and alienate other cultures. For Appiah, it is the accumulation of “perspectival shift[s]” on the individual level that initiates cultural contamination in a broader sense, and, in affirming the individual origination of such “perspectival shift[s],” he undeniably presumes the individual autonomy of deciding for oneself what attitude to adopt towards any cultural representation.

However, this cosmopolitan vision based on individual adaptation overlooks the non-linear struggles throughout the actual process of cultural hybridization, where various collective institutions take form to influence individual agency. Appiah’s explication of the eradication of footbinding in China, for instance, manifests such negligence by generalizing the revolutionary details, assuming the rapid change in customs as rationally unexplainable: “What had been beautiful became ugly; ornamentation became disfigurement. The appeal to reason can explain neither the custom nor its abolition.” Correspondingly, the only plausible explanation lands on “the consequence of our getting used to new ways of doing things” (Appiah). Yet this explanation is a relatively rough one. Appiah solely stresses the result of people getting used to footbinding, while leaving out many painstaking details in the struggling process. In his essay “From Cultural Capital to National Stigma: The Anti-Footbinding Movements in China and Taiwan,” scholar Yen-Wei Miao thoroughly represents the violent political endeavors during the revolutionary period. According to Miao, despite the groundbreaking establishment of anti-footbinding institutions, the first-documented Nanhai Jie Chanzu Hui (Foot Emancipation Society) in 1883 was soon dismissed due to “huge pressure from the community” (Miao 220). In 1898, government conservatives forcefully suppressed early anti-footbinding movements following the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform (Miao 232). Even Appiah himself mentions numerous “older women with bound feet” who suffered greatly from “the agonies of unbinding.” Taking these factors and occurrences into consideration, what triggers the “perspectival shift” here cannot simply be an individual choice of getting used to natural feet. Social institutions and cultural communities impacted individual reactions at all times.

To some extent, Appiah does acknowledge the collective influences within struggle and their contradictory moral implications. He mentions this contradiction in discussing women’s equality in Islamic cultural communities, where “liberty,” displayed mostly in Western human rights treaties, and “diversity,” referring to the respect for Islamic cultural traditions, may “well be at odds” (Appiah). But Appiah does not provide a resolution to the dilemma. Collective influence seems something easily ignored once individuals become the “proper object of moral concern.” This confidence—that individual autonomy outweighs collective influences—is most conspicuously displayed in Appiah’s reference to Zulu viewers of American soap dramas. Appiah contends that these viewers in the periphery do not necessarily suffer from cultural imperialism as cultural preservationists often claim, for they are not powerless “blank slates” susceptible to intrusive cultural influences. Put differently, individuals do not passively submit to higher forms of institutional impacts, but instead hold a considerable degree of autonomy in their choice-making. Nevertheless, if the rhetoric of cultural imperialism fails to recognize individual autonomy in cultural interaction, Appiah’s unmitigated affirmation of individual agency does not ultimately explain the cultural reaction of Zulu viewers either. The two seemingly oppositional perceptions—submission to imperial imposition and agency in cultural self-determination—are in fact compatible and, moreover, often co-exist and work together. As individuals are “[deciding] for themselves what they do and do not approve of,” their conscious responses can also reflect and indicate the changing dynamics of the imperialistic cultural framework. Given the historical trajectory of colonialism and its present influence on South African societies, these individual audiences may well have participated in constructing and reproducing the cultural othering of themselves without without their own realization. Therefore, we must bear in mind the possibility that they inhabit the accompanying cultural discourses as they approve messages in the soap drama, just as we should equally attune ourselves to the inherent political statement of anti-colonialism in their disapproval as such. That imperialist ideologies largely embed themselves in personal values is what puts individual autonomy onto the precipice.

Manifested in this television-drama example is the omnipresence of collective influences. While individuals do possess agency in their choices to embrace or reject cultural values, collective influences still tend to predominate over individual autonomy. This is because individuals do not interact with cultures the way workers operate machines; individuals are themselves part of the culture—they are inside the community of a particular culture, or a collection of mutual-influencing cultures. Furthermore, as contemporary American writer and The New York Times columnist Ross Douthat points out in his article “The Myth of Cosmopolitanism,” it is human nature to “seek community.” This intrinsic desire to belong predetermines the confinement of individual agency to collective wills and standards.

Even if individual autonomy manages to overcome collective influences, the subsequent question comes to whether every individual can access that degree of autonomy. The answer is apparently negative, for both real (realistically existing) and imagined (organized upon shared social identities) communities hierarchize their members on the spectrum of social mobility. Take class as an example. An individual’s degree of autonomy depends extensively upon their possession of economic and social capital; people with different socio-economic conditions thus constitute different communities of classes. This variation limits the right of making autonomous choices mostly to upper-class individuals, turning this right into a sign of privilege instead of freedom. The prestigious background of pioneering figures in the anti-footbinding movement evidences this point. As American scholar Brent Whitefield introduces in his essay “The Tian Zu Hui (Natural Foot Society): Christian Women in China and the Fight against Footbinding,” founder of Natural Foot Society, Alicia Little, was the “wife of a prominent British merchant and writer”; Kang Youwei, who founded the Anti-footbinding Society in Canton, enjoyed high reputation in the political domain in addition to status as a “famous literus and writer” (206). With many others, these progressive elites shared commonality in possessing superior family backgrounds and higher social status to back them in their activist work. People lower down on the social ladder, by contrast, are often “too poor to live the life they want to lead” at all, for they do not possess the basic financial means to attain political leverage such that their demands can receive legitimization and satisfaction (Appiah). Moreover, lack of economic and social capital brings about subsequent poverty in cultural capital, making the poor not only unable to afford autonomy, but also unaware of the notion at all given their limited access to education.  

We can formulate similar analyses upon other realms of social identities such as race, gender, religion and upon historical trajectories to uncover their hierarchizing impact on individual autonomy. The reality can display further complications since these identities often interlock and burden one another. We will not discuss intersectionality in detail, but the main point here is that hierarchical divisions in collective communities make it almost impossible for equal individual autonomy in choice-making. Together with humans’ instinctive urge for community belonging, these two factors demonstrate Appiah’s confidence in individual autonomy as idealistic and lacking contextual considerations. Returning to the specific process of the anti-footbinding campaign, we see that whether they were government officials, progressive pioneers, or the general masses, all sought transformative power as members of collective entities rather than separate individuals; aggressive power struggles continued throughout the movement until reformers attained sustainable power dominance over other collective forces and, consequently, eradicated footbinding. Apparently, these collective struggles went beyond the individual level, or at least tied individual choices to underlying social impositions.

Moving to the contemporary global context, one may argue that Appiah’s project centering on the individual actually attains more promise given social development through time and a cultural environment that is correspondingly more open. Yet we must also note that such openness simultaneously entails more direct confrontation of diverging beliefs and values among different cultural groups as well. In the face of these confrontations, individuals are more inclined to attach themselves to collective influences in search of security and legitimacy. In this sense, the power of the collective may matter more than we think and, given the trend of globalization, can operate on more subtle ideological levels. Cosmopolitan elitism serves as a paradigmatic example here. The more that privileged individuals seemingly detach themselves from their local communities, the more they tend to aggregate into a new community that Douthat calls the elite tribe. “Global citizens,” as they often refer to themselves, these elitists still have their own “distinctive worldview” and “shared values” that alienate other communities and individual experiences (Douthat). What engenders further stake, moreover, is individuals’ unawareness of such collective enclosure: the sharpening collective influences have accumulated more power by becoming invisible. Douthat himself is deeply concerned with this unnoticed congregation: “[I]t’s a problem that our tribe of self-styled cosmopolitans doesn’t see itself clearly as a tribe.” Following Douthat’s line of argument, we may find this exact elitist pitfall in Appiah’s cosmopolitan project of contamination. His underlying affirmation of “individual freedom” in the contaminating process is substantially an aristocratic by-product available to “insider” elites alone: only they are entitled to exercise the contamination model of cosmopolitanism because of their privilege in choice-making. When Appiah humbly claims that “cosmopolitans don’t insist that everyone become cosmopolitan,” he already ignores and marginalizes the majority of individuals who have no agency to choose that vision.

Does this mean that we should not take individuals “as the proper object of moral concern” in comprehending cosmopolitanism (Appiah)? Of course not. Appiah’s highlighting of individuals is still significant and illuminating in its humanistic value. It is important for us to note that this statement comes primarily as a critical response to three other claims: cultural preservationalism, cultural imperialism, and neo-fundamentalism. While cultural preservationism rigidifies cultural representations into fixations and blocks their development, the fight against cultural imperialism often enters the pitfall of prioritizing socio-political agendas over cultural analysis. Neo-fundamentalism, on the other hand, imposes exclusive values in the name of universal truth upon communities and individuals. All three claims tend to overlook or distort the individual will for their own ideological ends. With its acknowledgment of cultural interactions and its allowance for plurality of values, contamination therefore carves a respectful space for individual voices.

However, the pitfall that Appiah enters in endorsing individual agency is that he confuses moral concern anchored in the individual with complete personal autonomy in addressing cultural differences; correspondingly, the cosmopolitan ideal of contamination relies entirely upon individuals of different cultural backgrounds “get[ting] used to one another” (Appiah). Having acknowledged the individual will, this claim still fails to take into account the multiplicity of contexts in which the individual is situated and whose influences they often internalize. In fact, the decisions that individuals make towards new and old cultures do carry cultural imprints in the past and inform ongoing cultural dynamics, and therefore must not be treated as random, personal choices alone. Positioning individuals “as the proper object of moral concern” does not mean that we completely dismiss the roles of “nations, tribes or ‘peoples’”; instead, communities and groups as such are essential clues for us to comprehend and evaluate the choices that individuals make, to unpack the broader socio-cultural transformations in place, as well as the challenges they bring to individual lives. Appiah’s notion of cosmopolitanism wipes off this contextual analysis in place of a plurality of autonomous choice-making actions on the individual level.

Beneath this interpretation lies a universalist approach that I want to place on alert. Note that Appiah himself does distinguish cosmopolitanism from the “intolerant universalism” of neo-fundamentalism, whose members share a faith containing particular values that exclude others. In refinement, he affirms a faith in “universal truth,” yet also claims to be “less certain that we already have all of it” (Appiah). The universalism that I intend to pinpoint, however, alludes less to the principles and values that Appiah conceives of tentatively, but more to the conceptualization of individual participants who live with these values, which is that individuals in the cosmopolitan vision of contamination exist as abstractions, homogeneously possessing the attributes of autonomy and independence. We have seen Appiah’s refutation of the “blank slate” presumption, where individuals are seen as susceptible to the graffiti of global capitalism and neo-colonialism; yet ironically, by undermining the complexity of social impacts, Appiah envisions a form of cultural interaction that potentially formulates “blank slates” of another kind—an imagined, depersonalized individual as a pure social member, perpetually cut off from specific cultural contexts, and forever unmarked by any historical imprints.

To clarify, this abstraction does not mean that Appiah fails to take individual experiences into account; in fact, the entire investigation is predominantly anchored in individual perspectives, from his personal observation of the modern-traditional juxtaposition in the old Kumasi Royal Palace to the exemplification of ordinary television audience in Kumasi. What I want to call into question is his theorization of personal responses to cultural phenomena. Rather than preserve them as individual representations of diverse socio-cultural dynamics, Appiah attributes these responses to a generic and homogeneous attribute of individual will, the authenticity of which, as we have discussed above, remains at stake. This totalizing theorization, as Douthat expresses, can oftentimes make the “experience of genuine cultural difference [become] far more superficial.” Put differently, unifying cultural responses into an imagined political mechanism of individual freedom risks erasing cultural complexities and their rich expressions.

Concerned with this potential cultural erasure, Douthat challenges us to “disappear into someone else’s culture”—to look more closely into individual responses and uncover the embedded socio-cultural signals in broader social contexts. To exemplify, Douthat particularly includes his own peaking cosmopolitan experiences at age eleven, “attending tongues-speaking Pentecostalist worship services” and “playing Little League in a working-class neighborhood.” Different from Appiah, however, Douthat does not make any theorizing move in these experiences; he leaves these experiences to speak for themselves. Behind this strategic disposition, I would argue, lies Douthat’s alternative conceptualization of cosmopolitanism in a broader sense. Instead of systemizing varied cultural experiences and encounters into a universal explication, Douthat prompts us to analyze culture with the approach of “disappearance,” where the explorer is “ready to be transformed by what it [the cosmopolitan attitude] finds.” In one way, this statement finds common ground Appiah’s affirmation of pluralism. Yet, by “disappear,” Douthat highlights an irreducible intertwinement between individual representations and the cultural contexts in which they are immersed. Disappearing into one’s culture, accordingly, accentuates the cultural conditions as much as the individual lens. This irreducible intertwinement is what Appiah’s project lacks. When Appiah’s contamination model detaches individuals from their cultural contexts to better enact cultural accustoming, Douthat parts company to argue that individuals are never apart from cultures. Symbolically speaking, individuals are their cultures: they carry, represent, and receive deeply-imprinted impacts from their cultural surroundings. Hence, a cosmopolitan vision that values humanity, that claims “every human being has obligations to every other,” must not reside in the human individual level alone, but dig deeper into the specific socio-cultural forces that both empower and restrain the individual (Appiah).

As we have discussed, Appiah’s contamination model of cosmopolitanism fails to capture the inseparable correlation between individuals and the collective entities that they embed themselves in. Douthat’s cosmopolitan critique, from this perspective, revises our understanding of cosmopolitanism by positioning individuals and cultural contexts as an organic whole. This revision attains significance in that it manages to acknowledge and manifest the struggles facing every individual in complex cultural conditions; at the same time, the vision does not sacrifice this individual locus, but ultimately lands upon a unique  perspective by bringing cultural dimensions to one’s individual identity.
This vision has yet to achieve perfection. Conflicts such as the one that Appiah raises about “liberty and diversity” remain unclear: having acknowledged the other culture and understood individuals within that culture, we may still face fundamental moral conflicts embedded in cultural differences. Do we decide, then, to respect or to abandon that cultural representation? Is there a third alternative to cope with the conflicts? Can cosmopolitanism offer a linear answer or solution? These questions may pertain to the study of cosmopolitanism with broader indications about human empathy in the globalized-yet-fragmented contemporary era.


Works Cited

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. “The Case for Contamination.” The New York Times Magazine. The New York Times Company, 1 Jan. 2006.

Douthat, Ross. “The Myth of Cosmopolitanism.” The New York Times. The New York Times Company, 2 Jul. 2016.

Miao, Yen-Wei. From Cultural Capital to National Stigma: The Anti-Footbinding Movements in China and Taiwan. Sep. 2004. New York University, PhD dissertation.

Whitefield, Brent. “The Tian Zu Hui (Natural Foot Society): Christian Women in China and the Fight against Footbinding.” Southeast Review of Asian Studies, vol. 30, 2008, pp. 203-212. EBSCOhost, eds.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=96d8885b-3a13-4a5f-838d-0f9643b3af2a%40sessionmgr4009.

A New Dimension of Chinese National Identity: An Emerging Live House Culture in China

Image Credit: Katherine Pellegrino

by Cindy Wang 王新语

Read the Faculty Introduction.

Every night, nearly a hundred music lovers huddle together and shake to the rhythm of the bands. In a secluded and tiny live house in downtown Shanghai, these independent young artists wear Hanfu, the national costume of Han people, and use traditional props such as folding fans, which contrast sharply with the highly modernized night view of the cosmopolis. The lyrics of the songs have very strong regional characteristics; they reflect local history and incorporate words and phrases from local dialects such as momozi 沫沫子,“procrastinator” in Lanzhou dialect. These heartfelt attachments to the native culture are, in fact, expressions of indignation and criticism of the cultural globalization. In response to this irresistible trend of globalization, rather than passively adapting to foreign cultures, live house artists and their followers have formed a unique culture in which a new dimension of Chinese national identity is coming into being.

After almost four decades of China’s reform and opening up, Chinese culture has gradually moved away from blindly absorbing foreign cultures to reconstructing its own cultural space as a part of global culture; it is becoming increasingly influential in shaping global trends. Although it seems that Chinese culture, in order to expand its territory, is undergoing a process of reinventing itself to be more international, open, and inclusive, the reality is not a one-sided adaptation but rather a negotiation between global and native culture. This negotiation is best reflected by the emerging live house culture in China, which utilizes global marketing strategies to let the world rediscover the vitality of China’s age-old culture. Behind the adoration of Chinese civilization is, however, a sense of insecurity about losing the nation’s roots in its culture. To cope with such an identity crisis, pioneers of the live house culture in China are experiencing a process of concretizing Chinese national identity in which they intensify and reassert the notion of being Chinese.

To defend and strengthen Chinese national identity, live house culture constructs a new conception of being Chinese that is free from the restriction of nationality and ethnicity. Chinese national identity can be read in different dimensions. One is as the identity of the People’s Republic of China, the political foundation on which Chinese nationalism and the “Chinese dream” has been built (He 55-57). This interpretation is closely associated with China’s “century of humiliation” and its rise to great power status in today’s international arena. According to scholar Honghua Men, another approach to defining Chinese national identity is based on ethno-cultural identity, as national identity is essentially a consensus on a specific system of values that is deeply rooted in a nation’s history and culture (190).

Extending beyond these two visions of Chinese national identity, the new live house culture conceptualizes and simplifies Chinese national identity in symbolic cultural, historical, and religious elements. One example is the lyrics from a folk song called “兰州 兰州” (“Lanzhou Lanzhou”) performed by 低苦艾 (Low Wormwood), a band from Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu Province: “兰州~淌不完的黄河水向东流/兰州~东的尽头是海的入口。”(“Lanzhou, the endless Yellow River runs to the east/ Lanzhou, the end of the east is the entrance into the sea”) (line 11-12). These lyrics express connection to the city Lanzhou and resonance with Chinese national identity because the Yellow River is China’s mother river and the cradle of Chinese civilization. This song turns Lanzhou and the Yellow River into symbolic images of one’s love for this nation, which is powerful in terms of recalling people’s national identity. Another example is Sun Wukong (also known as the Monkey King), one of the main characters in a 16th century Chinese classical novel The Journey to the West. Over time, Sun Wukong developed into an icon of loyalty, love, courage, and resistance. The figure of the Monkey King is loved by many music lovers who are fond of live house culture because they think this character can best represent their attitudes toward music as well as life. The positive qualities of this mythological figure are a part of Chinese identity. In this way, both Chinese and foreigners who are fascinated by this culture can express their Chinese national identities by simply wearing a T-shirt with the figure of Wukong on it. Similarly, one without much knowledge of Chinese culture can display one’s self-identification as Chinese or craze for Chinese culture by wearing Hanfu or tattooing Chinese characters on one’s body. These practices of concretizing and simplifying Chinese national identity make it easy and straightforward for people, despite their nationalities and ethnicities, to express their affinity for “Chineseness.”

Such illustration and expression of the Chinese national identity is not a product of an isolated development of the notion per se but a result of the global and local conflict in the course of globalization. Anna Katrina Gutierrez, a researcher on the concept of glocalization, argues that there exists a “glocal heterotopia” in which “the threat of global homogenization and the fear of local isolation seek resolution through the establishment of a middle ground” (20). This claim suggests that globalization is a two-way communication in which global and local spheres agree, disagree, and compromise with one another. Although Gutierrez provides insights into this phenomenon of “glocal” by arguing that glocal areas raise the possibility of possessing “multiple identities” or “multiple dimensions to national identity,” she does not address how those new dimensions of national identity have intensified the original national identity (23). In this case, the seemingly rebellious practices of the live house artists keeping to tradition and resisting cultural assimilation are, in fact, an outcome of mixed emotions composed of feeling tired of cultural homogenization and numbness in cultural interchange. For instance, 布衣乐队 (Buyi Band), a band that has been active for more than twenty years in the live house community, produced the song “羊肉面” (“Lamb Noodles”), which praises the Chinese concept of home and maternal love through telling a story about lamb noodles, one of the most popular snacks in China:

幸福究竟是什么                                          (What on earth is happiness

妈妈最幸福的就是看你吃                          For me, the happiest thing is to watch the

的样子                                                              way you eat, my son                                         

你回家吧 困难的时候                                 Go home when you are in trouble

回家妈妈给你做最喜欢                              When you come home, Mom will cook you

呀                                                                    your favorite

你回家吧 困难的时候                                 Go home when you are in trouble

回家妈妈给你做你最喜欢                          When you come home, Mom will cook you

的呀                                                                            your favorite

羊肉面。(9-15)                                            Lamb noodles.) (9-15)

This song demonstrates what it means to be happy for an ordinary family in China, which reasserts Chinese traditional ideology and, at the same time, implies a disapproval of the outside world where there are chain stores of American fast food but no authentic lamb noodles.

This pride in local flavor implies an anxiety over and distaste for cultural homogenization perpetuated by standardization in the progress of globalization. As Douglas Blum, a professor and expert specializing in globalization, reveals, “[B]eing modern per se is also a palpable wish, one which in part reflects the internalization of a new, materialistic standard of ‘civilization’” (78). By applying Blum’s claim to today’s cultural development, it becomes clear that cultural homogenization is one prominent form of standardization, but people’s appetites for global culture also reflect psychological internationalizations of a standardized culture. In fact, some would argue that since live houses originated in Japan, this new live house culture in China precisely confirms the charge that Chinese national identity has been homogenized by the global culture. Although this claim seems plausible because there are indeed many foreign bands who have performed or will perform in these live houses, I would argue that this is just one example of how the emerging live house culture in China utilizes the opportunities and benefits of globalization to reinforce and promote Chinese national identity. Instead of getting lost in multiple dimensions of national identity, the live house culture in China returns to the bedrock of Chinese cultural elements, searches for salvation in tradition, and further sets a new trend of chinoiserie. By using lyrics with strong regional characteristics such as Lanzhou, the Yellow River, and lamb noodles, these live house artists convert Western musical genres into Chinese style.

This process of reconstructing Chinese national identity is not about simply denying all the newly-added dimensions of national identity and standing against the trend of globalization; it is a process of returning to the authentic by negotiating the global and local and then making globalization work for national interest. Introducing foreign bands is a form of marketing to attract foreign and Chinese music lovers in the first place. These live houses have special official websites in English only, as well as Facebook websites. By seizing the opportunities provided by globalization and with the help of marketing, foreigners have become a large proportion of the regular live house customers and are exposed to and influenced by the local culture. The increasing number of followers enables Chinese culture to play a larger role in the progress of globalization.

A new dimension of Chinese national identity is developing through the live house culture in China. Such practices of conceptualizing and simplifying markers of Chinese national identity not only reassert identity among Chinese people but also make it easier to blend with global culture. Moreover, Chinese national identity has been enriched by the “glocal heterotopia,” which has caused great impact on the local culture by adding new dimensions of national identity. Even more importantly, glocalization has highlighted and intensified the original dimensions of Chinese national identity. Instead of seeing globalization as a threat to the native culture, this emerging live house culture employs it as a marketing approach to promote Chinese national identity. By reconstructing Chinese national identity on one hand and utilizing the global market on the other, Chinese culture is able to better cope with the trend of globalization and leaves its own mark on the world course.


Works Cited

Blum, Douglas W. “The Discourse of Globalization and Youth Culture.” National Identity and Globalization: Youth, State, and Society in Post-Soviet Eurasia. Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 74-104.

Buyi Band 布衣乐队. “Lamb Noodles” 羊肉面. Translated by Cindy Wang. So Long, Pocket Records, 2007.

Gutierrez, Anna Katrina. “Metamorphosis: The Emergence of Glocal Subjectivities in the Blend of Global, Local, East and West.” Subjectivity in Asian Children’s Literature and Film: Global Theories and Implications. Ed. John Stephens. Routledge, 2012, pp. 19-42.

He, Lichao. “Ready to Become a Great Power? The Recent Nationalist Movement and China’s Evolving National Identity.” Journal of International and Area Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, pp. 53-70.

Low Wormwood 低苦艾. “Lanzhou, Lanzhou” 兰州 兰州. Translated by Cindy Wang. Lanzhou, Lanzhou, Maybe Mars Records, 2011.

Men, Honghua. “China’s National Identity in Transition: Domestic and International Perspectives (1982-2012).” Social Sciences in China, vol. 35, no. 2, 2014, pp. 189-207.